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WATCH COMMITTEE  
of the  
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions

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SUMMARY OF INDICATIONS DURING PERIOD

1. KOREA: There are continuing indications that the Communist forces in Korea are prepared to undertake a general offensive. The high level of vehicle sightings continues, enemy forces are disposed well forward, supply dumps have been established close to the front, and fresh or rehabilitated divisions are available for an offensive. There is a possibility that some 350,000 Communist troops, not accepted in present order of battle, may be in Korea, bringing the total possible enemy strength to about 950,000. Recent reports suggest that the Communist air force in Manchuria has continued to increase and that the Chinese Communists may have a goal of 16 air divisions. Enemy air forces have recently shown increasing aggressiveness and several enemy air-to-ground attacks, although of no immediate significance, could indicate an enemy intention to commit a portion of his air strength against U.N. ground forces. There is both military and political evidence that the U.S.S.R. firmly supports the action of the Chinese Communists in Korea and is providing increasing materiel and personnel assistance. Despite various recent reports that Soviet or "Caucasian" units or troops have been entering Korea, there is no clear evidence that such a military force exists as a formal organization of any appreciable size or that Soviet or Caucasian personnel are to be committed in front-line units. Unconfirmed reports allege that a Soviet air division from Sakhalin is being sent to Manchuria for possible use in the Korean war. Communist propaganda continues to provide no indication that the Communists are seeking to terminate the cease-fire talks permanently but there are indications that this propaganda is designed rather to place the blame on the U.N. for any breakdown of negotiations.
2. JAPAN: An exchange of messages between Stalin and Mao Tse-tung has reaffirmed the "firm alliance" of the U.S.S.R. and Communist China against Japan and particularly emphasized the military aspects of the Sino-Soviet pact. Communist propaganda against the Japanese Peace Treaty has derided the significance of a treaty that excludes major Asian nations, served warning to the Japanese, and indicated that the drive against Japanese rearmament is only in its initial stages.

Army and USAF reviews  
completed

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3. **CHINA:** There are continuing reports of CCF paratroop training and of the possible ultimate employment of these troops against Formosa, but present military activity in South China continues to be largely defensive in nature. Two submarines, probably Soviet, have been reliably observed off the South China coast.
4. **INDOCHINA:** Reports indicate that Chinese Communist aid to the Viet Minh is increasing, but no major Viet Minh operations are expected before October. There continues to be no reliable evidence of the presence of CCF military units in Indochina or that a major intervention is imminent, but the influx of Chinese Communist political personnel is reportedly increasing.
5. **GERMANY:** Engineer units from all six Soviet armies are continuing to rotate to the Elbe River training area.   
 may indicate the arrival of small units or observer teams from these forces for the autumn maneuver season. The number of twin-jet bombers in Germany has increased to 60 and the construction of long runways is progressing. The sudden imposition of a heavy tax on West German motor traffic into Berlin is another move against the vulnerable West Berlin economy. It may be designed only as pressure for the signing of an interzonal trade agreement but could have serious long-term results.
6. **SATELLITES:** A Hungarian decree abolishing all known exemptions from compulsory military service may indicate a growing need for manpower to meet Hungarian military requirements. Although East German military forces are not now expanding, there are indications of continued Soviet interest in the East German military establishment. The Czech Minister of Defense has publicly announced the government's intentions to improve Czech air defenses.
7. **IRAN:** There continue to be no definite indications of future Soviet action against Iran. The clandestine Azerbaijan radio has predicted an early collapse of the Iranian Army.
8. **U.S.S.R.:** The reported recent observation of cruisers in the Northern Fleet indicates that the two cruisers which left the Baltic this July may remain with the Northern Fleet. A third and previously unknown cruiser has also been reported there. The build-up of Naval forces in this area is of long-range strategic significance. Soviet amphibious training has been reported near Vladivostok. Recent information confirms the establishment of at least two new Soviet Military Districts during 1949, which will probably facilitate Soviet military administration and simplify mobilization procedures in the Districts concerned. There have been no significant changes in Soviet propaganda, which continues to emphasize the threat of war and to intensify the "peace" campaign.

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**CONCLUSIONS**

1. The Soviet Armed Forces in being are in an advanced state of readiness for war and could initiate offensive operations with little or no additional warning. Military and political indications are that the Communists intend to insist upon a solution of controversial problems strictly along lines which further Communist world objectives. There are no indications that the Soviets and their Communist allies, in pursuing their major objectives, intend necessarily to avoid actions which might precipitate global hostilities.
2. Indications are that the Communist forces in Korea are prepared for and are continuing to build up their capabilities to undertake a major offensive, which may be launched at any time. There continue to be no clear indications of their intentions with respect to a continuation of the cease-fire discussions.
3. Further major Chinese Communist military operations, other than in Korea, do not appear to be imminent. There are further indications that Chinese Communist support of the Viet Minh is gradually increasing.
4. There are no firm indications of Soviet intentions to initiate hostilities in Europe or the Near East in the near future, but the gradual increase of Communist military capabilities in Europe continues. The immediate significance of the increasing economic pressure against West Berlin cannot now be assessed.

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### ANALYSIS OF INDICATIONS

#### 1. Indications of Intentions in the Far East.

##### a. KOREA.

- (1) Ground. There are continuing indications that the Communist forces in Korea are prepared to undertake a general offensive and that the build-up of logistical capabilities is being sustained. Increasing numbers of reports also suggest the possibility that substantial numbers of Chinese Communist troops, not accepted in present estimates of troop strength, may be in Korea. Vehicular traffic in enemy rear areas, although not reaching the level of the previous week, continues to be very high, and indicates a growing stockpile of supplies. Average over-all sightings were 2070 per day, of which 837 were southbound. A FECOM estimate, which concludes that the enemy is capable of exercising his potential for offensive action "at any time which suits his purpose," notes the following developments of the past several weeks: six rested and rehabilitated divisions are opposite the Kumhwa-Tungdae front and 16 to 18 divisions, fresh or rehabilitated, are on the west and central front; two tank units, with a total of 200 to 240 tanks, are on the west-central front; the enemy is disposed well forward, a net of supply dumps has been established close to the front, bridges have been repaired and obstacles to the steady flow of traffic have been removed. A consistently high volume of artillery fire indicates that supplies of ammunition are in excess of any previous level. According to PW reports, the enemy is relieving units presently in the line by fresh or rehabilitated units, after which a general offensive will begin. The enemy meanwhile has continued his sharp resistance to U.N. probing attacks; the intensity of the fighting increased markedly during the past week and the Communists launched several heavy counterattacks to regain lost terrain.

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train traffic northward through that city has recently been very heavy and is similar to that which was observed preceding the last Communist offensive in Korea. This report would tend to substantiate other reports of the recent movement of additional Chinese Communist troops northward from South China. In addition, PW reports suggest the possibility that elements of the 20th Army Group, including the 67th, 68th, and 70th and possibly the 69th Armies, may be located in the area south of Wonsan. These units, which are not as yet accepted, would involve approximately 105,000 troops. Earlier reports of the movement of substantial elements of the First Field Army to

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Korea also have received added confirmation from a recent report that troops of the 1st, 3d, 4th, 5th and 8th Armies have entered Korea as replacements or reinforcements. These troops would total approximately 108,000 men. Identification by PW's of the 139th Division of the 47th Army, in addition to the already accepted 140th Division of this Army, is another indication that this entire Army may be in Korea. The estimated strength of enemy units, considered possibly in Korea but not as yet confirmed or accepted, is 350,000, indicating that the enemy may have about 950,000 troops available for commitment in an offensive. Although enemy dispositions behind the immediate front are not firm, a large CCF force possibly may be concentrated in the west sector, and recent North Korean redispersions towards the east sector further suggest this possibility. No additional evidence of a build-up of enemy mechanized forces has been received, although an unconfirmed report states that some 250 medium tanks were to be assembled at the Mukden arsenal during July and August for shipment to Korea.

- (2) Air. Recent reports suggest that the Communist air force in Manchuria continues to increase. There are some indications that the Chinese Communists may have a paper organization to accommodate 16 air divisions and that, in addition to the units already in existence, they have some cadres formed. The number of aircraft promised the Chinese by the Soviets, according to previous unconfirmed reports, has been sufficient to meet such a program, and there has been no slackening noted in the increasing build-up of the CCAF. Some of the indicated cadres may be composed of Soviet personnel who will be replaced by Chinese as the training program progresses.

During the past several days, the encounters between U.N. jets and enemy MIG-15's over northwest Korea have shown a definite increase in aggressiveness on the part of the enemy and a willingness to engage in combat as far south as Pyongyang. Seven enemy air-to-ground attacks occurred during the early daylight hours of 3 September. Attacks were made by conventional aircraft against forward positions along the central front, and both bombs and strafing attacks were employed. Although such attacks during daylight are unusual, their nature was such that one or two aircraft may have accounted for all the activity. While the level of this activity thus far is not significant and does not appear to be more than a continuation of sporadic harassing attacks, it could be an indication of the enemy's intention to commit a part of his air strength against U.N. ground forces. Possibly significant in this connection is a report that on 27 August the Chinese Communists and North Koreans established some form of advance headquarters at Pyongyang, following a visit to Pyongyang by the Commanding General of the Chinese Communist Air Force and a Soviet adviser.

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- (3) Soviet Assistance and Reported "Caucasian" Forces. Previous Watch Committee reports have included numerous indications, both military and political, that the U.S.S.R. not only firmly supports the action of the Chinese Communists in Korea but has been providing increasing aid in the form of materiel and technical and advisory personnel. Evidence that Soviet military personnel are in fact already actively participating in the Korean war is available from quite reliable reports that Soviet AAA personnel are manning guns in Korea, and it appears probable that Soviet assistance also has included the assignment of increasing numbers of personnel in such fields as radar operators and advisors to Chinese Communist and North Korean units. A reaffirmation of the Sino-Soviet unity of purpose in the Far East was contained this week in an exchange of messages between Mao Tse-tung and Stalin (see Japan below) in which Stalin asserted that the "unbreakable friendship" of the Soviet Union and China "will serve the cause of assurance of peace in the Far East against all and every aggressor and warmonger."

In addition to this firm evidence of Soviet support of the Communist forces in Korea, there have been a number of recent reports of the arrival in Korea of elements of an "International Volunteer Army," also sometimes referred to as the "Soviet Puppet Forces."

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\_\_\_\_\_ have stated either that an "international" force of generally undefined composition is to be committed in Korea or that "Caucasian" troops in numbers from a few hundred to up to 20,000 are at various points in Korea. A number of these reports have stated that such troops are in North Korean uniforms, leaving their nationality in some doubt, and some reports have referred to the troops as Soviets, Rumanians, Hungarians or Czechs. Some recent reports have stated that "Caucasian" or Soviet troops are as far south as Kunchon. Despite the volume of such reports, however, there is no reliable information as to the strength, composition or location of such "Caucasian" troops or of the use which might be made of them. It is noteworthy that PW reports continue generally negative with respect to the presence of Soviet or other Caucasian troop units in North Korea and that there has been no evidence from Eastern Europe of the recruitment of military personnel or withdrawal of military units for service in Korea, although the presence of several Eastern European medical units has been accepted in Korea for some time. There is thus no clear evidence that a new<sup>a</sup> "international force," volunteer or otherwise, exists as a separate organization of any appreciable size, or that such Soviet or Caucasian personnel as are in Korea are to be committed as front-line units.

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<sup>a</sup> Underscored for emphasis.

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With respect to a possible increase in Soviet air participation in the Korean war, a recent unconfirmed report states that in mid-August a Soviet air division on Sakhalin was ordered to Manchuria for participation in the Korean war as "volunteers" when the cease-fire negotiations break down. This division (which cannot be identified by D/I USAF) reportedly is equipped with first-line combat aircraft and is moving to the Vladivostok area for regrouping. The division is then to move to Mukden and Dairen to await orders to move to the Korean front. Still another source reports that a Soviet air division is to move from Sakhalin to Dairen and that a part of it will then be assigned to the defense of Manchuria and the remainder to the "Volunteer Air Force" in Korea.

- (4) Political. Although Communist comment on the cease-fire discussions continues to provide no indication that the Communists are seeking to terminate the talks permanently, further charges of U.N. violations in the Kaesong area are obviously designed to place the onus on the U.N. for any complete collapse of the negotiations and possibly also to provide a justification for any new Communist offensive. In the latter connection, a statement on 3 September by Chinese "democratic organizations" reverted to the earlier Communist line in declaring that only the defeat of American aggression in Korea can safeguard Chinese security and peace in the Far East, and that all Chinese must wage "a protracted struggle for the victorious termination of the Korean war against aggression." Apart from this statement, however, the Communists are still seeking to give the impression that they do not consider the talks at Kaesong to be permanently terminated. Whether Communist tactics are in part designed to coincide with the Japanese Peace Treaty discussions remains speculative, although a few reports have been received that the Chinese Communists are seeking to prolong the cease-fire discussions to await developments at the San Francisco Conference.

In the first direct Soviet comment on the Kaesong talks since their inception, *Izvestiya* charged on 1 September that the U.S. is creating obstacles at Kaesong as part of its general strategy of "rejecting any possibility of a peaceful regulation of international problems," and stated that U.S. efforts to maintain tension were in part to secure acceptance of the Japanese Peace Treaty. Earlier, Soviet newspapers on 29 August alleged that the U.S. wanted to keep its troops in Korea in order, "at a suitable moment," to attack the U.S.S.R. and Communist China. Similar charges have appeared previously in Soviet propaganda.

b. JAPAN. An exchange of messages between Stalin and Mao Tse-tung on the anniversary of Japan's surrender has served as a top-level reminder that the Sino-Soviet alliance is directed against Japan and any country allied with her. Notable in these messages (which were not exchanged last year)

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was the reiteration of the "firm alliance" of the Soviet Union and Communist China "directed at the joint prevention of the restoration of the aggressive forces of Japan," and the particular emphasis on the military aspects of the alliance. Echoing the exchanges, a Pravda comment stressed the role of Sino-Soviet friendship in "averting the danger of reviving Japanese aggression."

These messages appear to have been aimed as a warning to the Japanese and the West regarding the consequences of U.S. policy towards Japan. The Chinese Communist press already has begun to prepare local opinion for conclusion of the treaty in asserting that even if the treaty is signed it cannot bring any gains to the imperialists. Communist comments in general have been devoted to deriding a treaty that does not include the major powers of Asia and to warning the Japanese in particular of the "pernicious path" on which the U.S. is leading them. Communist comment has further implied that only the initial signs of opposition to the treaty have appeared and that a more concerted drive is to be launched to induce the Japanese to delay their rearmament and their integration into a U.S.-led Pacific system. There continues, however, to be no indication of what specific further action the Soviets may take.

c. CHINA.

[redacted] the Chinese Communists are conducting fairly extensive paratroop training. Latest figures [redacted] are that some 32,000 paratroopers have completed training and that approximately 34,000 more are now undergoing training, mainly at Kaifeng, Peiping and Tientsin. [redacted]

[redacted] There continues to be no evidence of plans for an imminent attack on Formosa, however, and reports [redacted] generally indicate that present Chinese Communist military activity there is primarily defensive in nature. An unconfirmed report [redacted] states that approximately 1000 Soviet coast artillery guns have been delivered to China for defense of the east and south China coasts. Although the figure appears to be considerably exaggerated, it is possible that some such guns were received.

The recent sighting of two submarines, probably Soviet, about 60 miles south of Macao is the first reliable observation of submarines operating in South China waters, although numerous previous reports of such activity have been received. At least one of the submarines was reported equipped with snorkel. Their southerly course suggests that their destination may have been Yulin on Hainan Island, which frequently has been alleged to be a submarine base. [redacted]

[redacted] have indicated that there is no significant military activity, either air or naval, under way in the Yulin area of Hainan Island. Very recent reconnaissance has again confirmed that Sanya Airfield, adjoining Yulin, is inactive despite many reports to the contrary.

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d. **INDOCHINA.** [redacted]

although Chinese Communist material aid to the Viet Minh is increasing. no major Viet Minh operations are expected before October. The Viet Minh are reported to be suffering from shortages of food, high sickness rates, increased desertions and recruitment difficulties while continued flood conditions hamper military action. [redacted] although the number of Chinese Communist military "advisors" is not increasing, new propaganda units, possibly for use as political commissars, are arriving. A regular trucking unit is reportedly being formed in North Vietnam and some 50 tons of arms have allegedly been consigned to one Viet Minh division. Despite some reports that Chinese Communist units may have entered Indochina during July, [redacted]

[redacted] no evidence that Chinese Communist troops are in Tonkin. It is estimated, however, that there are probably at least 15,000 Chinese Communist personnel infiltrated as cadres, advisors and technicians and that some may be organized into small units, predominantly Chinese, in the Langson-Caobang border area. [redacted] meanwhile continue to assert that the Chinese Communists are placing increasing emphasis on their commitments to the Viet Minh and that the aid includes "volunteers" reportedly numbering 30,000 to 100,000. Although such infiltration is well within Chinese Communist capabilities, there continue to be no firm indications that an intervention on such a scale is either under way or imminent.

e. **BURMA.** Continuing rumors of an increase in Burmese Communist operations during September have included a report that an attack will start simultaneously with a September offensive in Korea. The Chinese Communists are allegedly to furnish assistance in the form of equipment, personnel and air support. This report is from a source of questionable reliability.

2. Indications of Intentions in Europe and the Near East.

a. **GERMANY**

- (1) Soviet Ground Activity. Reported engineer training on the Elbe River continues to indicate that all six Soviet armies in Germany are rotating their engineering bridging units to the Elbe for training in river-crossing techniques. The apparent completion of this engineer training by two of the mechanized armies and the return of their engineer units to their respective areas may indicate that these armies are now ready for divisional or army exercises, which normally occur in September and early October.

No additional reports have been received concerning the Soviet unit or units which are reported to have crossed into Germany from Poland via Goerlitz. [redacted]

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- (2) Soviet Air Activity. There are no indications of any increase in Soviet 24th Air Army jet fighter strength over the 580 MIG-15's reported two weeks ago, but Type-27 twin-jet bombers have increased from 48 to 60, and PE-2 conventional bombers dropped from 117 to 63. In addition to the aircraft usually carried, 6 IL-12 transports and 6 Type-24 gliders apparently are stationed in the Zone. The airfield program of construction of long runways in Germany is progressing rapidly at four fields, is slightly delayed at a fifth, and is substantially lagging at the remaining two. There are indications that materials and machinery available in the Soviet Zone are insufficient for work on more than five or six locations at any one time. Reconstruction work on Zerbst Airfield was completed during August. In addition to new taxiways and hardstands, 8,500 feet of the old runway has been completely resurfaced and the runway is suitable for use by heavy bombers.
- (3) New Restrictions on Berlin Transport. In a further move to harass the Western Powers in Berlin and to disrupt the West Berlin economy, the U.S.S.R. on 31 August began levying a heavy tax on all West German motor traffic to and from Berlin. The tax, which must be paid in East Marks obtained at official exchange points at the arbitrary rate of one East Mark to one West Mark, will increase the cost of highway transport to Berlin by at least 20 percent. Food costs in Berlin are expected to rise by at least five percent. This move, the latest in a series against the vulnerable West Berlin economy, may be designed as another pressure tactic to bring about the signing of an interzonal trade agreement, or as a means of obtaining large amounts of Western currency for illegal trade. It could also have serious long-term results if the Soviets persist in the latest restriction. The new move, coming after the closing of the Mittelland Canal and the recent export permit restrictions may be followed by further restrictions and could be a step towards the reimposition of a total blockade. Present traffic restrictions are the strictest since 1949, when the blockade was broken.

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**b. SATELLITES.**

- (1) Satellite Ground Forces. Rumors reportedly are current in Budapest to the effect that either a general mobilization or the induction of the 1931 class was to start on 4 September. There have been no previous indications that a general mobilization in Hungary is impending, but the call-up of the 1931 class is expected this fall in accordance with normal practice. (Information from Hungary further tends to discount the likelihood that any substantial elements of this class have already been inducted, as was reported last week.) A recent Hungarian decree which abolishes all known publicly listed reasons for exemption from military service may indicate a growing need for manpower to meet the requirements of the present Hungarian military program. A report of uncertain reliability states that the Soviet Military Attache to Czechoslovakia recently initiated a survey of the political reliability of Czech Army personnel in the event of hostilities and that only 18 percent were judged to be completely reliable.

Recent confirmation that Soviet Lt. General Makarov has been assigned as Chief of the Military Division, Soviet Control Commission in Germany may be a long-range indication of the importance which the Kremlin attaches to the East German military establishment. Makarov, who has held top level assignments in the political-military field since 1943, was assigned to Germany in 1950 to effect a general house-cleaning of the Control Commission. Present reports continue to provide no indication, however, of an imminent expansion of the East German military forces. Moreover, the training cycle of the Alert Police was somewhat retarded by participation of its personnel in the recent World Youth Festival.

- (2) Czech Air Defense. Press reports of the presence of the Czech Defense Minister and the Soviet Military Attache at the exercises of the Anti-Aircraft Military Academy may indicate particular Soviet interest in the build-up of the AA defenses of the Czech industrial area. The Defense Minister's reported remarks emphasized the importance of military defense of the Czech "Air Ocean" against air attack. The aim of the government, he is reported to have said, is to "seal" Czech territory against enemy air attacks, and the civilian population must be trained to participate. This is the first public statement of a high Czech official that air defense measures are receiving the serious attention of the government, and indicates that civil air raid precautions and military air defense will be expanded and improved in the near future.

c. IRAN. During the past week there continued to be no definite indications of future Soviet action against Iran. The clandestine Azerbaijan Democratic Station, located in the Soviet Union, in a broadcast commemorating the tenth anniversary of the Allied occupation of Iran in

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1941, stated that the Iranian Army had then been "eliminated within 17 hours," losing "all its German weapons in one battle." The broadcast, in Kurdish to the Near and Middle East, alleged further that "It will not be long before the same Army will lay down its American weapons before the battle of the masses," and concluded with a warning that the Iranian Army commanders "should realize that their day is coming to an end, and all their weapons will be of much use to those who will obtain them after a single day's operation." The Azerbaijan station has frequently made strong attacks on the Iranian Government.

### 3. General Indications of Soviet Intentions.

#### a. SOVIET NAVY.

- (1) Northern Fleet. [redacted] the sighting of three Soviet cruisers and two destroyers off the Kola Inlet (Murmansk area) during the period 13 to 20 August. The Soviet Northern Fleet was believed to have no cruisers until July of this year when two Chapaev Class cruisers were reliably reported to have proceeded to this area from the Baltic. If there is a third cruiser in the area as reported, it is possible that the vessel was transferred from the Far East via the Northern Sea Route. It is also possible that the ship in question was not a cruiser but the destroyer Baku of the Leningrad Class. In any case, the cruiser sightings appear to indicate that the vessels transferred from the Baltic will remain in the Northern Fleet rather than moving on to the Far East. The Northern Fleet is the most strategically placed of the Soviet fleets for operations against the Western Powers and the build-up of naval forces in this area is of long-range significance.
- (2) Soviet Amphibious Training, Far East. A sighting has been reported in the Sea of Japan, just off Vladivostok, consisting of one possible cruiser, one unidentified large vessel and 15-18 small craft (believed to be landing craft) which appeared to be conducting amphibious training exercises. An amphibious training exercise conducted by the type naval units reported is considered possibly true and similar training has been reported in previous years. The Soviets have two cruisers in the Far East and had close to 100 amphibious type craft there in 1945. These training exercises are probably part of regularly scheduled naval exercises.

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#### b. SOVIET MILITARY DISTRICTS.

[redacted] has provided confirmation that at least two additional Military Districts (Gorki and Voronezh) were created in the Soviet Union during 1949 and that a split of the North Caucasus Military District into two Districts may also have occurred. Although there has been no indication of an increase in military units in these areas, the recreation of these Districts, which existed during World War II, is probably designed to improve administrative procedures with regard to conscription, training of reservists and the

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assignment of personnel and materiel for mobilization purposes. A further indication that this measure may be of long-range significance in Soviet military planning is the fact that the new Districts are considered secret and have never been referred to in the Soviet press, although other Military Districts are frequently mentioned.

c. PROPAGANDA. There are no indications of any significant changes in the Communist propaganda line. In a follow-up of a previous editorial calling for a "popular front" struggle against Fascism, the Cominform Journal on 24 August rebuked some Communists for a lack of understanding of the tasks of organizing a "people's front to combat the war danger." As a specific manifestation of "popular front" tactics, the Central Committee of the East German SED addressed an open letter to West German Socialists and Communists asking for a unified workers' struggle against militarism and for better working conditions. To provide the "proper" setting for "popular front" appeals the Soviet propaganda organs continued to uphold the specter of war, stressing American plans for alliance with German and Japanese militarists. The 23 August decisions of the Plenum of the Soviet Peace Committee in Moscow confirmed the previously noted trend for an intensified peace campaign this fall. The campaign is to concentrate on mobilizing popular opposition to the U.S. as the promoter of war, poverty and Fascism. As a prelude to the signature campaign to be opened in the U.S.S.R. in September, the Soviet Peace Committee signed the W.P.C. appeal for a Big Five Peace Pact.

*for*   
JOHN WECKERLING  
Brigadier General, GSC  
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